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Using and Evaluating Audit Decision Aids1 
Robert H. Ashton 
Duke University 
John J. Willingham 
Peat Marwick Main & Co. 
This paper is intended to stimulate discussion among auditing practitioners 
and researchers about the use of audit decision aids. While audit decision aids 
have a long history, they are presently assuming greater importance as the 
auditing profession is in a period of transition from experience-based to 
research-based audit approaches. The issues raised in this paper may be of 
interest to auditing practitioners concerned with managing that transition, and 
to auditing researchers concerned with the scientific evaluation of audit 
decision aids. 
The types of audit decision aids we discuss are designed to assist auditors 
in making decisions required in the collection and evaluation of evidence for the 
purpose of expressing an audit opinion or rendering other audit-related client 
services. Today's audit decision aids are based increasingly on the implications 
of research studies, typically rooted in disciplines other than auditing, that 
examine audit decision making in a controlled, rigorous manner. In saying this, 
we do not mean to imply that the trend toward research-based audit tools is 
restricted to the types of decision aids discussed in this paper, nor do we mean 
to suggest that this is a trend of recent origin. Consider, for example, earlier 
work in statistical sampling based on the disciplines of mathematics and 
statistics (e.g., Arkin [1957]), or in systems-based approaches to auditing 
which relied on the discipline of systems analysis (e.g., Skinner and Anderson 
[1966]). 
The decision aids discussed in this paper are linked to an extensive body of 
research known as "human information processing" or "behavioral decision 
theory," which is explicitly concerned with understanding, evaluating, and 
improving decision making. In auditing, maintaining and improving the quality of 
decision making has been reinforced recently by governmental activities 
emphasizing audit effectiveness and by competitive pressures emphasizing 
audit efficiency. Proponents of decision aids based on the decision research 
literature maintain that audit efficiency and effectiveness can potentially be 
improved by employing such aids. 
The paper is organized in three major sections. First, we present an 
1 We are grateful to Alison Ashton, Lisa Koonce, Jim Loebbecke, Bill Messier and Ira Solomon for 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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overview of audit decision research and the decision-aid development efforts to 
which it is linked. Second, we argue that the effectiveness of audit decision aids 
should be evaluated, instead of being accepted on faith alone. Topics discussed 
include: (1) the issue of choosing whether to use audit decision aids or, 
alternatively, to train auditors to improve their decision making, (2) various 
claims made by developers and proponents of decision aids (in auditing and 
elsewhere), and (3) specific considerations involved in the validation of audit 
decision aids. The final section of the paper outlines some potential effects 
(both positive and negative) of using decision aids in audit practice. There we 
examine possible effects on both individual auditor judgment and the auditing 
firm that employs decision aids. 
Research & Development in Audit Decision Making 
This section provides an overview of (1) contemporary research in audit 
decision making, and (2) development efforts, in the form of audit decision aids, 
which are closely linked to this research. We do not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive review of audit decision research (see, e.g., Ashton [1982a,b; 
1983], Libby [1981], Mock and Turner [1981], and Ashton et al. [1989] for 
reviews). Moreover, by restricting our focus to audit decision aids we do not 
mean to imply that this is the only area in which audit decision research has had 
an impact on practice or policy making (see, e.g., Elliott and Jacobson [1987], 
Kinney [1981], and Ward [1987] for additional discussion). Instead, the 
purpose of this section is to provide some perspective for the later discussion 
of audit decision aids. 
Research in audit decision making is based on the theoretical perspectives 
and research methods of cognitive psychologists, economists, decision theo-
rists and others concerned with how people do (and should) make decisions. 
The ultimate goal of the research is to provide a scientific basis for improving 
audit decisions, thus favorably impacting the efficiency and/or effectiveness of 
audits. More proximate goals are to evaluate audit decision making in order to 
know whether (or in what respect) decisions might need improvement, and to 
understand audit decision making in order to be able to evaluate it. Thus, the 
research is concerned with how audit decisions are made, with how well they 
are made, and with ways of making them better. 
While some audit decision research might be considered basic, most of it 
has a strong applied flavor. Applied and basic research can be distinguished in 
that applied research concerns the scientific discovery of knowledge having 
applicability to specific, identifiable problems in the short run, while problem 
specificity and a short-run perspective are not necessary features of basic 
research. Both applied and basic research can be distinguished from develop-
ment in that development concerns the practical use or implementation of 
knowledge—often by designing and producing new processes, systems or 
other devices—but does not involve the discovery or production of new 
knowledge [Ashton, 1981; Kaplan, 1977]. 
Research 
Audit decision making research has addressed several phases of the audit, 
including evaluation of analytical review results, preliminary estimates of 
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planning materiality, internal control evaluation, decisions about compliance and 
substantive testing, evaluations of the work of internal auditors, going-concern 
evaluations, the choice of audit opinions, and reviews of financial forecasts. 
Most of the research has focused on issues that relate to the "tactical 
planning" of evidence collection activities, i.e., planning an appropriate mix of 
compliance and substantive tests to support an opinion on financial statements 
at a reasonable cost [Felix and Kinney, 1982]. 
One way of viewing the dominant focus of audit decision research is via the 
Cushing and Loebbecke [1986] framework depicted in Table 1. This framework 
outlines five major stages of audit activities which typically are performed in a 
roughly sequential fashion, as well as a sixth category, called "continuous" 
activities, which typically are performed at any of several stages of the audit 
process. Most audit decision research has addressed audit activities in stages 2 
through 4 of this framework. Particular emphasis has been placed on 2.0 (i.e., 
all of stage 2) and on 4.5, with less emphasis on 3.0, and some on 5.1 through 
5.3. Loebbecke [1983] provides examples of audit activities in all six stages of 
the framework to which decision research could contribute. 
The existing research in audit decision making has been concerned with 
two broad, but related, issues—evaluating the quality of audit decision making 
and exploring ways of improving audit decision making. Three standards for 
evaluating audit decisions have been employed. First, decision accuracy has 
been used for situations in which an independent, external criterion of 
"correctness" has been available. Second, statistical rationality has been 
employed by focusing on whether auditors interpret and use audit evidence in a 
logically consistent manner. This is done by comparing audit decisions with 
those prescribed by normative models or statistical principles of decision 
making. Finally, the consistency of decisions—both over time and across 
auditors—has been assessed. 
Some typical examples of results from audit decision research are as 
follows: (1) while auditors often are relatively accurate in repetitive decision 
situations, room for improvement exists because they do not always (a) 
perceive correctly the relevance of information used in decision making or (b) 
use relevant information in a consistent fashion; (2) auditors are often 
insufficiently sensitive to certain types of information (e.g., base rates of 
occurrence of certain events), and often do not fully appreciate the inverse 
relationship between sample size and sampling variability; (3) although individ-
ual auditors have been found to make reasonably consistent decisions over 
time, different auditors using the same evidence often tend to make decisions 
that disagree markedly. While this lack of consensus among auditors may be 
considered problematic per se, it also means that the accuracy and statistical 
rationality of audit decisions are likely to be poor for some auditors [Ashton, 
1985]. 
This summary of typical results suggests that research in audit decision 
making tends to focus on the shortcomings of "unaided" decision making. In 
particular, much of the research has sought to identify systematic errors, 
biases, and inconsistencies in audit decision making. It is important to realize 
that this research focus describes the entire field of decision research, not just 
that in auditing. However, as von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986, p. 530] point 
out in a broader context, " A research focus on systematic errors and 
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Table 1 
A Comprehensive Outline of the Audit Process 
(From Cushing and Loebbecke [1986, pp. 6-7]) 
1.0 PRE-ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
1.1 Accept/Reject New Client 
1.2 Establish Terms of Engagement 
1.3 Assignment of Staff 
2.0 PLANNING ACTIVITIES 
2.1 Obtain Knowledge of the Business 
2.11 Preliminary Analytical Review 
2.12 Appraisal of Risk 
2.2 Preliminary Estimation of Materiality 
2.3 Review of Internal Accounting Control 
2.31 Preliminary Phase 
2.32 Completion Phase 
2.4 Develop Overall Audit Plan 
2.41 Determine Optimal Reliance on Internal Accounting Control 
2.42 Design Compliance Testing Procedures 
2.43 Design Substantive Procedures 
2.44 Write Audit Program 
3.0 COMPLIANCE TESTING ACTIVITIES 
3.1 Conduct Tests 
3.2 Make Final Evaluation of Internal Accounting Control 
3.21 Make Evaluation 
3.22 Modify Audit Plan 
4.0 SUBSTANTIVE TESTING ACTIVITIES 
4.1 Conduct Substantive Tests of Transactions 
4.2 Conduct Analytical Review Procedures 
4.3 Conduct Tests of Details of Balances 
4.4 Post Balance Sheet Review Procedures 
4.5 Evaluate Results of Substantive Procedures 
4.51 Aggregate Findings 
4.52 Make Evaluation 
4.53 Modify Audit Plan 




5.0 OPINION FORMULATION AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES 
5.1 Review Financial Statements 
5.2 Review Audit Results 
5.3 Formulate Opinion 
5.4 Draft and Issue Report 
6.0 CONTINUOUS ACTIVITIES 
6.1 Supervise Conduct of Examination 
6.2 Review Work of Assistants 
6.3 Consider Appropriateness of Continuing Relationship with Client 
6.4 Make Required Special Communications 
6.41 Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control 
6.42 Material Errors or Irregularities 
6.43 Illegal Acts by Client 
6.5 Consult With Appropriate Persons in Connection With Special Problems 
6.6 Document Work Performed, Findings, and Conclusions in Appropriate 
Working Papers 
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inferential biases can lead those who read the research with an uncritical eye to 
the notion that such errors and biases characterize all human thinking." 
Common sense and informal observation suggest that this is not the case, in 
auditing or in the rest of life. On the other hand, it would be naive to think that 
human decision making is perfect, or that the shortcomings that exist will go 
away if ignored. Fischhoff [1982, p. 442] concluded a review of the "decision 
biases" literature as follows: 
An elusive summary from the present review is that people's reservoir 
of judgmental skills is both half empty and half full. People are skilled 
enough to get through life, unskilled enough to make predictable and 
consequential mistakes; they are clever enough to devise broadly and 
easily applicable heuristics that often serve them in good stead, 
unsophisticated enough not to realize the limits to those heuristics. 
Development 
Along with the emphasis on research that documents and evaluates the 
shortcomings of human decision making is a corresponding emphasis on the 
development of tools, or decision aids, that may help people to compensate for 
those shortcomings. The development of decision aids for improving unas-
sisted decision making is perhaps the most direct practical result of audit 
decision research, as well as of decision research in general. A review of 
decision research in several fields observed: "The existence of biases and 
errors in unaided judgments is part of the motivation for aiding the judgment 
process; the assumption is that aided judgments are less subject to error. The 
aid is based on a prescriptive formulation that decomposes the problem into its 
separate elements and presumably helps the decision maker to overcome the 
limitations of unaided judgments. Thus the development of decision aids 
requires an understanding of the processes involved in performing the task, 
together with a suitable prescriptive theory that can serve as a normative 
formulation for the problem" [Pitz and Sachs, 1984, p. 155]. 
Following Rohrmann [1986, p. 365], we define a decision aid as 
" . . . any explicit procedure for the generation, evaluation and selection 
of alternatives (courses of action) that is designed for practical applica-
tion and multiple use. In other words: a [decision aid] is a technology, 
not a theory." 
Auditing firms have always used decision aids. Examples are audit programs, 
internal control questionnaires, and various types of checklists [Elliott and 
Kielich, 1985]. Such aids are simply tools based on the accumulated experience 
of generations of auditors. In this sense, audit tools are analogous to the tools 
of everyday life, as experience is the earliest basis for tool development. The 
archaeological scholar Childe [1954, p. 9] noted that 
Even the simplest tool made of a broken bough or a chipped stone is the 
fruit of long experience—of trials and errors, impressions noticed, 
remembered, and compared. The skill to make it has been acquired by 
observation, by recollection, and by experiment. It may seem an 
exaggeration, but it is yet true to say that any tool is an embodiment of 
science. For it is a practical application of remembered, compared, and 
collected experiences of the same kind as are systematized and 
summarized in scientific formulas, descriptions, and prescriptions. 
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Such tools are based on organized knowledge, not on the results of 
research in decision making. In contrast, many of today's audit decision aids 
are research-based, and it appears that the trend toward the use of research-
based audit tools will accelerate. Examples of research-based audit decision 
aids are paper-and-pencil worksheets and quasi-statistical formulas for deter-
mining non-statistical sample sizes [AICPA, 1983; Elliott, 1983], multiple 
regression and discriminant models for predicting going-concern problems 
(e.g., Altman and McGough [1974], Kida [1980]), and time series and 
regression models for identifying unusual fluctuations in analytical review 
[Arlington et al. 1983; Kinney, 1983]. Audit decision aids of this type are 
discussed by Ashton [1983] and Libby [1981]. 
The most elaborate (and costly) form of audit decision aid is knowledge-
based expert systems. We rely on Rauch's [1984, p. 55] definition: 
. . . a class of computer programs intended to serve as consultants for 
decision making. These programs use a collection of facts, rules of 
thumb, and other knowledge about a limited field to help make 
inferences in the field. They differ substantially from conventional 
computer programs in that their goals may have no algorithmic solution, 
and they must make inferences based on incomplete or uncertain 
information. They are called expert systems because they address 
problems normally thought to require human specialists for solution, 
and knowledge based because researchers have found that amassing a 
large amount of knowledge, rather than sophisticated reasoning tech-
niques, is responsible for the success of the approach. 
Essentially, a knowledge-based expert system is a computational method of 
performing a decision task which uses an explicit representation of an expert's 
knowledge, generally in the form of a series of "if-then" rules instead of in the 
form of a statistical formula such as multiple regression or discriminant analysis 
[Chignell and Smith, 1985b]. Expert systems have received substantial 
attention from researchers in the field of artificial intelligence (e.g., Bobrow et 
al. [1986], Chignell and Smith [1985a], Davis [1982], Duda and Shortliffe 
[1983], Michie [1980], Stefik et al. [1982]), and the accounting profession is 
currently exploring their potential applications in auditing, taxation, and 
management advisory services [AICPA, 1987]. Abdolmohammadi [1987] and 
Messier and Hansen [1987] provide reviews and discussions of expert systems 
in auditing. 
Evaluating Audit Decision Aids 
Even though decision research may demonstrate errors, biases and 
inconsistencies in audit decision making, it does not necessarily follow that 
decision aids should be developed and used. Lewis et al. [1983] point out that 
the expected benefits of using decision aids must exceed their costs, and that 
the reasons for biases and inconsistencies must be understood before appropri-
ate aids can be identified. Moreover, using decision aids may not be the only 
way to reduce biases and inconsistencies. An alternative is to train auditors to 
improve unassisted decision making. 
Decision Aids vs. Training 
Under what conditions is the development of audit decision aids preferable 
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to training? In a more general context, Fischhoff [1982, p. 424] provides some 
insights into the question of aids vs. training by discussing "whether responsi-
bility for biases is laid at the doorstep of the judge, the task, or some mismatch 
between the two." Fischhoff argues that the appropriate "debiasing" strat-
egies depend on the source of the bias, as summarized in Table 2. 
The strategies listed in part 1 of Table 2 address potential methodological 
problems of the research studies which have demonstrated biases. Although of 
considerable importance in the design of future studies, they need not concern 
us here. Assuming that current research results in audit decision making can be 
validly interpreted as indicating biases and inconsistencies, as we believe they 
can, parts 2 and 3 of the table are relevant to the present discussion. 
If the source of the problem is thought to be faulty judges (auditors), 
Fischhoff argues that the appropriate debiasing strategies depend on whether 
the judges are considered "perfectible" or "incorrigible." If they are 
considered "perfectible," then some type of training, ranging from a simple 
Debiasing Strategies According to Underlying Assumption About the Source of 
the Bias (From Fischhoff [1982, p. 424]) 
Table 2 
Assumption 
1. Faulty tasks 
a. Unfair tasks 
Strategies 




Use better response modes 
Ask fewer questions 
Demonstrate alternative goal 
Demonstrate semantic disagreement 
Demonstrate impossibility of task 
Demonstrate overlooked distinction 
2. Faulty judges 
a. Perfectible individuals Warn of problem 
Describe problem 
Provide personalized feedback 
Train extensively 
Replace them 
Recalibrate their responses 
Plan on error 
b. Incorrigible individuals 
3. Mismatch between judges and tasks 
a. Restructuring Make knowledge explicit 
Search for discrepant information 
Decompose problem 
Consider alternative situations 
Offer alternative formulations 
Rely on substantive experts 
Educate from childhood 
b. Education 
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warning that judgment biases may exist to an extended training program aimed 
at controlling particular biases, is suggested. In this case, having auditors 
participate in "decision exercises" such as those discussed by Ashton [1984] 
might be useful. However, if the judges are considered "incorrigible," then 
Fischhoff suggests replacing people with "some superior answering device" 
(p. 426), adjusting their responses if the direction and magnitude of their biases 
are predictable, or somehow allowing for their biases when planning actions 
based on them. Thus, according to Fischhoff, if individual decision makers are 
considered "perfectible," training is suggested, while if they are considered 
"incorrigible," some type of decision aid may be more appropriate. 
On the other hand, if the source of bias and inconsistency is thought to be a 
mismatch between the judge and the task (part 3 of Table 2), then either a 
restructuring of the "person-task system" is needed to increase their 
compatibility, or extensive education is needed for developing general capabili-
ties (as opposed to training for developing specific skills). Restructuring, which 
is closely allied with the use of decision aids, can involve "(a) forcing 
respondents to express what they know explicitly rather than letting it remain 
'in the head'; (b) encouraging respondents to search for discrepant evidence, 
rather than collecting details corroborating a preferred answer; (c) offering 
ways to decompose an overwhelming problem to more tractable and familiar 
components; (d) suggesting that respondents consider the set of possible 
situations that they might have encountered in order to understand better the 
specific situation at hand; and (e) proposing alternative formulations of the 
presented problem. . . . " [Fischhoff, 1982, p. 427]. 
In summary, Fischhoff is essentially arguing that using decision aids is likely 
to be preferable to training when it is possible to restructure the decision task 
to a form more compatible with the decision maker's information-processing 
capabilities, or when the success of training efforts is considered highly 
uncertain. While Fischhoff does not explicitly consider either the costs of 
training or the costs of developing decision aids, the relative costs of these two 
alternatives are obviously important. What do we know about the relative costs 
(or effectiveness) of training and decision aids in auditing? Under what 
conditions, or for which types of decisions, is one likely to be more effective or 
less costly than the other? Which specific form of training, or of decision aid, is 
likely to be most effective for particular types of decisions? While the present 
paper deals with decision aids instead of with training, it is important to realize 
that audit decision aids are but one of a larger class of "decision improvement 
options" [Libby, 1981] that could be pursued. 
Claims About Decision Aids 
Suppose the option of developing decision aids has been chosen over 
training, at least for certain types of audit decisions. What benefits can decision 
makers expect from using these aids? Rohrmann [1986, p. 368] observes that 
"Decision makers above all ask for 'good' decisions that solve their problems, 
but they also want quick and cheap and comprehensible procedures." Devel-
opers and proponents of decision aids claim that such aids offer all of these 
features. As Rohrmann notes, "The developers claim [that decision aids] make 
decisions easier and better because they decompose the decision process into 
comprehensible parts, reveal goals and preferences, guide information search 
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and integration, and are based on a rational concept . . . for the comparison, 
evaluation and selection of alternatives" (p. 363). In a similar vein, Hammond 
et al. [1980] identify six sets of claims that are often made about the value of 
decision research for aiding decision makers. These claims are summarized in 
Table 3. 
Some of the claims identified by Hammond et al. [1980] are (implicitly or 
explicitly) made about decision aids in auditing. The principal claims, at least for 
relatively simple aids involving discriminant and regression models and "struc-
tured" paper-and-pencil aids, relate to the accuracy and consistency of audit 
decisions (e.g., Ashton [1983], Libby [1981]). It is often claimed that (1) when 
correct answers exist, aided audit decisions will, over a series of decisions, be 
more accurate than unaided audit decisions, and (2) whether or not correct 
answers exist, aided audit decisions will be more consistent, i.e., less variable, 
both over time and across auditors, than will unaided audit decisions. 
The claims for expert systems are similar but, like the systems them-
selves, are more elaborate. In addition to aiding audit decision making by 
structuring problems, indicating pertinent information sources, and combining 
information to reach a preliminary recommendation [Wright, 1984], it is also 
claimed that expert systems will (1) enable expertise to be distributed 
throughout the audit firm (e.g., to personnel at multiple locations) and, 
particularly, to be "pushed down" to lower organizational levels, (2) facilitate 
Table 3 
Claims About the Value of Decision Research for Aiding Decision Makers 
(Adapted from Hammond, McClelland and Mumpower [1980, pp. 108-110]) 
1. Clarifies thinking 
2. Educates the decision maker 
a. Makes hidden assumptions and implicit tradeoffs explicit 
b. Forces consideration of the consequences of actions 
c. Identifies what is important for making decisions and where more information 
is needed 
d. Identifies what is not important for making decisions (a by-product of 2c) 
e. Forces explicit recognition of uncertainty 
f. Facilitates understanding of the complete problem 
3. Promotes improved communication 
a. Helps decision maker communicate, defend, and justify decisions and actions 
b. Helps resolve conflicts among decision makers 
c. Facilitates training of new decision makers 
d. Facilitates intellectual, nonemotional discussion of important issues 
4. Promotes a policy perspective 
a. Saves time, money, and unhappiness 
b. Facilitates adaptation to new information or changing values 
c. Facilitates the "passing on" of policy to future decision makers (similar to 3c) 
d. Facilitates dissemination of policy to those affected 
5. Helps distinguish preferences for consequences from beliefs about whether conse-
quences will occur 
6. Creates new solutions, insights, and alternatives 
9 
staff training by focusing on simulated audit problems and the knowledge 
needed to solve them, (3) ease documentation efforts by printing out a record 
of the process used by the system to make a recommendation, (4) improve the 
consistency of decisions over time and across auditors, and (5) result in less 
time devoted to decision making by eliminating time that is wasted on factors 
irrelevant to the decision (e.g., Elliott and Kielich [1985], Wright [1984]). 
Validation of Decision Aids 
While the importance of validating decision aids has been recognized (e.g., 
Gaschnig et al. [1983], O'Leary [1987], Pitz and Sachs [1984]), it has often 
been noted that few attempts at systematic evaluation have been made, 
particularly by independent evaluators [Fischhoff, 1980; Hammond et al. 1980; 
Rohrmann, 1986]. Instead, evidence about the effectiveness or efficiency of 
aided decision making is largely anecdotal, having been acquired on a trial-and-
error basis in the field. However, aided decision making should be evaluated 
scientifically for the same reasons that unaided decision making should be 
evaluated—to understand the conditions under which it is effective, and to 
provide a sound basis for improving it when needed. An additional reason for 
evaluating aided decision making is that decision aids are not costless. 
How should one evaluate decision aids? Two broad approaches are to 
evaluate the process embodied in the aid or to focus on the outcomes generated 
by it. Process-oriented evaluations, which may be particularly germane for 
expert systems, focus on the mechanism by which outputs are generated from 
inputs, and may include examination of information search, information process-
ing, and the interaction between the aid and the user (e.g., problem clarifica-
tion, explanation capability, and documentation). The major drawback of 
process-oriented evaluations is that evidence about improved decisions is only 
indirect. In contrast, outcome-oriented evaluations focus explicitly on the 
quality of decisions made with benefit of the aid, but only provide information on 
whether an aid is effective or ineffective, not why [Jungermann, 1980; 
Rohrmann, 1986]. 
While we recognize that multiple approaches to decision aid evaluation are 
likely to be necessary, and that different evaluation standards are likely to be 
most appropriate at different points in the development and use of an aid, more 
attention to outcome-oriented evaluations seems desirable. The reason is that 
outcome-oriented evaluations are more direct and meaningful than process-
oriented evaluations in terms of discovering how well the aid "really works." 
With a few exceptions (e.g., bankruptcy or insolvency predictions), it is likely 
to be impossible to evaluate the performance of a decision aid against 
observable, empirical outcomes since unassailable "correct answers" are 
seldom known in auditing. This does not mean, however, that all types of 
outcome-oriented evaluations are impossible. One alternative, which has been 
used occasionally, is to compare aided decisions with those prescribed by 
normative models or statistical principles of decision making. 
Another possibility, which seems to have gone largely unnoticed in 
discussions of decision aids, is to compare decisions aided by one type of 
decision aid with those aided by some other type of decision aid. Such an 
evaluation might be especially informative in the case of expert systems, 
particularly if decisions aided by expert systems are compared with those aided 
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by simpler tools such as multiple regression or discriminant analysis. In many 
situations, of course, it will not be possible to construct regression or 
discriminant models based on relationships among environmental data because 
correct answers are not known. However, "policy-capturing" models, based 
on relationships among observable input variables and a series of actual 
decisions, can still be used. Much research has shown that simple policy-
capturing models consistently outperform unaided human judgment in re-
petitive decision situations (see, e.g., Ashton [1982a], Libby [1981]), and it is 
an open question as to how well policy-capturing models would fare against 
complex expert systems. A conceptual (nonempirical) analysis by Carroll 
[1987] concludes that expert systems are unlikely to achieve the performance 
level of policy-capturing models. (See Hammond [1987; 1988] for related 
discussions.) 
Even if an expert system performs better than a policy-capturing model or 
some other relatively simple decision aid in the same decision task, the 
difference in the costs of the two alternatives must be considered. The high 
cost of expert systems in auditing—related to development, knowledge 
acquisition, maintenance, updating, and preparation of user guides and training 
manuals (see Elliott and Jacobson [1987])—suggests that the cost difference 
between these two alternatives could be substantial. Obviously, if the cost 
difference between any two types of decision aids is sufficiently large, the one 
that performs better on such criteria as accuracy and agreement with experts is 
not necessarily the one that should be used. Of course, a similar statement can 
be made about comparing any type of aided decision making with unaided 
decision making: the increased cost associated with an aid could more than 
offset the benefits in terms of improved decision quality. Conversely, if the aid 
results in net cost savings, for example, by reducing the number of staff 
personnel required, then some decrease in decision quality associated with the 
aid might be acceptable. The point is that both costs and benefits of decision 
aids are important. 
The most common standard against which the outputs of decision aids are 
compared is unaided decision making. The unaided decisions are sometimes 
those of the experts whose knowledge was used in developing the aid, and are 
sometimes those of experts, novices, or other individuals who are independent 
of the development of the aid. While such comparisons are subject to all of the 
problems inherent in using consensus as a decision-evaluation criterion (e.g., 
people's decisions may agree perfectly yet all be wrong [Ashton, 1985]), in 
some situations this approach to "validation" may be the only one available. 
However, a standard that may be preferable to an individual's decision is a 
composite, or average, of the decisions made by several individuals. Research 
has shown repeatedly that composite decisions are more likely to be correct 
than are individuals' decisions (e.g., Ashton and Ashton [1985], Ashton 
[1986]). 
As noted earlier, little evidence is available about the impact of decision aids 
on outcome-oriented decision variables. Most of the research in this area 
involves complex decision support systems in non-auditing settings. Sharda et 
al. [1988] review 24 such evaluations and report an additional study of their 
own. The studies reviewed are grouped into four types, according to research 
method: case studies (4), field studies (6), field tests (3), and laboratory studies 
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(11). Field studies are distinguished from field tests in that the former typically 
involve no experimental control, while in the latter, the evaluator tries to 
manipulate some aspect(s) of the decision aid and control for other factors that 
could influence the study's results. 
Sharda et al. [1988, p. 140] point out that most claims regarding the 
effectiveness of decision support systems are based on case and field studies 
instead of on field tests or laboratory studies, which they maintain "is 
unfortunate as the latter two methods . . . allow for stronger inferences to be 
drawn." Their review of field tests and laboratory studies finds that the 
evidence is inconclusive, as evaluations have uncovered positive effects, no 
effects, and negative effects of decision support systems on various output-
oriented measures of decision quality (e.g., average profit per period, vari-
ability of profit over periods, cost, and decision time). Aldag and Power [1986] 
review several additional studies of computer-assisted decision making with 
similarly inconclusive results. 
Two studies have focused on the use of simple decision aids in auditing. 
Butler [1985] had 18 auditors from five firms of varying sizes make an 
assessment of sampling risk when evaluating the sample results of accounts 
receivable confirmations. Prior to making their risk assessments, 11 of the 
auditors had to answer four questions that were intended to remind them of 
factors relevant to an assessment of sampling risk, while the remaining seven 
auditors were not exposed to these questions. This "attention directing" 
device was considered a decision aid for the purposes of this study. A 
statistically-determined measure of sampling risk, based on a multinomial 
dollar-unit sampling program, constituted a normative criterion against which 
the aided and unaided risk assessments were compared. The results showed 
that the auditors who were exposed to the decision aid made risk assessments 
that were closer to the normative criterion, and also made more correct accept/ 
reject decisions about the account balance, than the auditors who were not 
exposed to the aid. 
While Butler [1985] focused on the evaluation of sample results, Ka-
chelmeier and Messier [1988] studied the choice of sample sizes by auditors. In 
a supplies inventory context, 180 auditors from two Big Eight firms (1) 
provided sample sizes without the availability of a decision aid (the "intuitive" 
group), (2) calculated sample sizes using a formal decision aid (the "aid" 
group), or (3) provided only the input parameters required by the aid (the 
"parameters" group) which the researchers then used to calculate sample 
sizes. The decision aid employed was the formula and tables contained in the 
SAS 39 Guide [AICPA, 1981; 1983]. Since a normative criterion for evaluating 
the auditors' sample sizes was not available, the analysis focused on differences 
in sample sizes for the three groups. 
The results showed that, on average, the "intuitive" group chose smaller 
sample sizes than the "aid" group, which chose smaller sample sizes than the 
"parameters" group. The difference in sample sizes between the latter two 
groups was interpreted as indicating a "working backward" effect; that is, the 
"aid" group's desired sample sizes might have affected their choice of input 
judgments for use in the decision aid. Additional analyses found, contrary to 
expectation, that the "parameters" group showed greater variability (less 
consistency) across auditors in sample sizes than the "aid" group, which 
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showed greater variability than the "intuitive" group. (A study in a non-
auditing context by Peterson and Pitz [1986] found that the availability of a 
decision aid (a multiple regression equation) was associated with greater 
consistency over time, as well as greater accuracy of individuals' decisions.) 
Effects of Audit Decision Aids 
In this section, we discuss several possible effects of using decision aids in 
audit practice. Some of these effects are "positive" in the sense of leading to 
improvements in audit decision making; others are "negative" in the sense of 
representing problems that must be controlled. Some of the effects are 
suggested by research studies; others are more speculative. These potential 
effects of audit decision aids are divided into two main categories: effects on 
individual judgment and effects on the auditing firm. We also discuss the 
potential importance of the initial implementation or introduction of decision 
aids. 
Effects on Judgment 
Increased emphasis on judgment: Instead of decreasing the importance of 
professional judgment in the audit process, as is sometimes feared, the use of 
decision aids might increase the importance of judgment. Note that a major role 
of audit decision aids is to combine several input judgments to reach a decision 
or recommendation, while it is the auditor's responsibility to supply those input 
judgments. For example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987] argue that, although the 
guidance on audit sampling adopted in 1981 added structure to the audit 
process, it also increased the number of judgments required of the auditor 
(pertaining to, e.g., the effect on sample size of control reliance, evidence from 
related tests, audit risk, and tolerable error). One implication of this shift from 
holistic to decomposed judgments may be the need for firms (and researchers) 
to pay more attention to training auditors in the proper formulation of input 
judgments for decision aids. A corollary issue, noted by both Elliott and 
Jacobson [1987] and Ashton [1983], is the possibility that auditors who provide 
such inputs will view their task as "mechanical" and not exercise their 
judgment carefully. Another issue of potential concern is the question of who is 
authorized to override the recommendations made by audit decision aids (and 
under what conditions, and to what extent). 
Structuring judgment inputs: The use of decision aids will likely require an 
increase in the structure of the input information. Prior research in other fields 
suggests that information processing is facilitated when the decision model 
employed and the information presentation structure are congruent (e.g., 
Bettman and Kakkar [1977], Bettman and Zins [1979]). Note that structured 
information differs from a structured decision aid, in that the former refers to 
inputs to decisions while the latter concerns the process by which inputs are 
combined. Structured input information may lead to greater decision consis-
tency, perhaps because structure makes it easier for people to use decision 
aids [de Hoog and van der Wittenboer, 1986], or perhaps because it facilitates 
unassisted information processing even in the absence of decision aids. 
Justifying decision aid outputs: Decision aids not only require auditors to 
execute a logical sequence of procedures and decisions, but also to document 
that they have done so. Documentation is one aspect of the broader area of 
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justifying, and being held accountable for, one's decisions [Staw, 1980; Tetlock, 
1983; 1985]. The potential importance of the justifiability of a decision is often 
noted by decision researchers (e.g., Tversky [1972], Adelbratt and Montgom-
ery [1980], Gibbins [1984]), but the effects of justification have not been 
systematically explored. However, some research suggests that one effect of 
having to justify decisions is an increase in the consistency of those decisions 
(e.g., Cvetkovich [1978], Hagafors and Brehmer [1983]). An important issue 
for research and practice is the extent to which increased consistency is due to 
using the aid as opposed to the accompanying emphasis on justification. A 
related question is the extent to which consistency could be increased by 
emphasizing justification in the absence of a decision aid. These issues may be 
particularly important when one considers that the cost of an increased 
emphasis on justification is likely to be considerably less than the cost of 
developing and maintaining decision aids. 
Increasing vs. decreasing consistency: As noted earlier, increasing the 
consistency of audit decisions—both over time and across auditors—is a major 
rationale for using audit decision aids. It is possible, however, that consistency 
could be decreased by the use of audit decision aids. Consider, for example, the 
sample size equation and tables described in the SAS 39 Guide [AICPA, 1981; 
1983]. Use of this decision aid requires that one judgment (sample size) be 
replaced by three judgments (tolerable error, degree of desired assurance, and 
error expectation). If sufficient variability exists across auditors in specifying 
these three inputs, then the resulting sample sizes computed by the formula 
could be more variable across auditors than the sample sizes determined by 
unaided judgment. Variability in input specification may explain Kachelmeier 
and Messier's [1988] finding of less agreement in aided than in unaided sample 
size decisions, as well as Bamber and Snowball's [1988] finding of no 
relationship between agreement in sample size decisions and the degree of 
structure of firms' audit methodologies. Thus, while decision aids are capable 
of "amplifying expertise" [Davis, 1984], they also are capable of amplifying 
judgment biases and inconsistencies. 
This possibility is discussed in a general setting by Slovic et al. [1977], and 
in an audit setting by Jiambalvo and Waller [1984], Slovic et al. [1977, p. 27] 
warn of "the risk of grinding through highly sophisticated analyses on inputs of 
very little value," and argue that " 'garbage in—garbage out' applies to 
decision aiding—with the particular danger that undue respect may be given to 
garbage produced by high-powered and expensive grinding." Thus, while the 
decomposition, or "divide-and-conquer" strategy on which many decision aids 
rely can lead to greater decision consistency and accuracy (e.g., Armstrong et 
al. [1975], Cornelius and Lyness [1980], Lyness and Cornelius [1982]), results 
such as those of Burns and Pearl [1981] and Chakravarti et al. [1979] suggest 
that "one should approach the 'divide and conquer' ritual with caution; not 
every division leads to a conquest . . . " [Burns and Pearl, 1981, p. 379]. As 
noted earlier, auditors might benefit from training in the proper formulation of 
input judgments. 
Circumventing the aid: Perhaps one of the more troublesome aspects of 
audit decision aids is the extent to which they might allow the user to 
circumvent their intent. For example, the intent of the sample size determina-
tion worksheet described by Elliott [1983], as well as the sample size equation 
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and tables described in the SAS 39 Guide, can be circumvented by "working 
backward." That is, an auditor could first select the sample size he or she 
desires and then provide input values which would yield this sample size. In that 
case, the judgmental inputs provided by the auditor could be determined in part 
by the chosen sample size, not vice versa as intended. As noted earlier, 
Kachelmeier and Messier [1988] found results consistent with this possibility. 
Ensuring the proper use of decision aids provides an interesting challenge for 
auditing firms. 
Effects on the Firm 
Increased structure of audit methodologies: A major way in which the use of 
audit decision aids is likely to impact audit firms is by increasing the degree of 
structure of the audit process [Willingham, 1986]. Cushing and Loebbecke 
[1986, p. 32] define a structured audit methodology as "a systematic approach 
to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence of procedures, 
decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive and integrated set 
of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in conducting the 
audit." The similarity between this definition and our earlier definition of 
decision aids should be apparent. 
The potential advantages and disadvantages of structured audit meth-
odologies are topics of debate (e.g., Mullarkey [1984], Sullivan [1984]), and the 
correlates of structure are becoming topics of research. For example, Kinney 
[1986] found an association between the voting patterns of members of the 
Auditing Standards Board and the degree of structure of the members' firms. 
Morris and Nichols [1988] found an association between audit firm structure 
and the predictability of firm-level materiality judgments. Bamber et al. [1987] 
found an association between firm structure and audit seniors' perceptions of 
their firms' organizational characteristics related to role conflict and role 
ambiguity. Bamber and Snowball [1988] found that auditors from structured 
firms were more likely to consult with peers and superiors as the uncertainty of 
their decision tasks increased than those from unstructured firms. Williams and 
Dirsmith [1987] found that in the U.S., clients of more structured audit firms 
announced earnings on a more timely basis than did clients of less structured 
firms. In contrast, Newton and Ashton [1988] found that in Canada, there was a 
positive relationship between audit firm structure and clients' "audit delay," 
i.e., the time from fiscal year-end to the audit report date. Whatever the effects 
of structured audit methodologies, they are likely to be amplified by the 
increased use of audit decision aids. 
Substitution of capital for labor: One implication of increased audit structure 
and increased use of decision aids is a greater investment in capital such as 
hardware and software, with possible impacts on pricing and management 
strategies within auditing firms. A corollary effect is a potential decrease in staff 
time required because of the automation of certain tasks traditionally per-
formed at the staff level. This could translate into decreased Wring for auditing 
jobs (with attendant consequences for accounting educators) and decreased 
turnover [Elliott and Kielich, 1985]. The base of the traditional pyramid in the 
organization of auditing practice could be narrowed. 
Accepting error: There is no doubt that the recommendations of audit 
decision aids will sometimes be in error (or at least will be judged to have been 
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in error in the light of subsequent information). While this is not a compelling 
reason to abandon such aids (people make errors too), auditors and auditing 
firms might have great difficulty accepting the error inherent in imperfect 
decision aids. However, the following example (adapted from Einhorn [1986; 
1988]) illustrates that accepting error can be wise. 
Imagine that you are placed in front of a panel that displays a red light 
and a green light. Your job is to predict which of the two lights will be 
illuminated on each of a series of trials. Each time your prediction is 
correct, you are given a cash payoff; if your prediction is wrong, there is 
no payoff. However, unknown to you, the lights are programmed to go 
on according to a random process with a given proportion of red and 
green, say 60% red and 40% green. 
If you approach this decision task like most people do, you will respond 
to the lights in the same proportion as they occur. For example, in this 
case people predict "red" 60% of the time and "green" 40% after 
they have had some experience with the task. Your expected payoff for 
such a strategy can be calculated as follows. Since you predict red on 
60% of the trials and red occurs on 60%, you will be correct (and 
receive the payoff) on 36% (.60 X .60) of the trials. Similarly for green; 
you predict green on 40% of the trials and green occurs on 40%. 
Hence, 16% (.40 x .40) of the trials will be correctly predicted. 
Therefore, over both red and green predictions, you will be correct on 
36% + 16% = 52% of the trials. 
Now consider how well you could do by using a decision aid that said: 
always predict the most likely color. Note that such a strategy accepts 
error; however, it also leads to 60% correct predictions (you always 
predict red, and red occurs 60% of the time). Since 60% is greater than 
52%, you would make more money if you accepted error and consist-
ently used the decision aid. However, most people try to predict 
perfectly . . . 
This example suggests that the relative amount of error inherent in aided 
versus unaided decision making is the important factor, not the absolute 
amount of error associated with the imperfect decision aid. It is not clear, 
however, that errors made by auditors and by audit decision aids would be 
equally acceptable (to either the auditor or the firm), or would result in the 
same amount of "regret" [Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982] for not 
having made a different decision. The same is true for errors made by different 
types of decision aids; for example, it is conceivable that errors made by expert 
systems would be more acceptable and result in less regret than errors made 
by multiple regression models because the former type of aid may seem more 
"human" than the latter. The choice among complex expert systems, simpler 
models, and unaided human judgment could amount to a choice among living 
with the consequences of different types of error (cf. Carroll [1987, p. 289]). 
Increased competition from non-accountants: One benefit often mentioned 
for expert systems in auditing is the dissemination of expertise throughout the 
firm. The negative side of this benefit is that such dissemination will not 
necessarily remain within the firm's boundaries. As Elliott and Kielich [1985, p. 
134] note, "anyone with the capability to develop or purchase such systems 
will become a potential competitor." Since the consulting and tax areas are not 
subject to as much regulation as auditing, they could be especially prone to this 
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possibility. (Michaelsen and Messier [1987] provide a review of expert systems 
in taxation.) 
Security considerations: Related to such competition is the possibility that 
decision aids, particularly expert systems, could be copied and passed along to 
competitors [O'Brien, 1985]. This could be particularly problematic for expert 
systems that contain confidential information about long-range firm strategies, 
and for expert systems or other types of decision aids developed for sensitive 
areas like fee determination. 
Legal liability: Ellis [1983, p. 4] suggests that expert systems "will be a 
minefield for professional bodies, especially over the question of legal account-
ability.'' If this is correct, then a possibility of some concern to auditors is that 
of being held liable for failure to follow the recommendations of expert systems 
or other aids. Under some circumstances, overriding a decision aid's recom-
mendations might be taken, prima facie, as evidence of "a lack of prudent 
regard for the rights of shareholders, employees, and other publics" [O'Brien, 
1985, p. 296]. 
Implementation of Decision Aids 
To this point, we have concentrated on the evaluation of audit decision aids, 
and on some possible effects of using them in practice. We conclude by drawing 
attention to the potential importance of the manner in which such aids are 
initially introduced or implemented. Although this topic has been virtually 
ignored by decision researchers in auditing, it is likely to be of great practical 
importance. However, some literature exists on the implementation of manage-
ment science models, computer-based information systems, and other types of 
managerial technology, and it may provide useful insights into preferred ways of 
implementing audit decision aids. A sample of this literature is contained in the 
Appendix. 
The literature on implementation has a strong how-to-do-it (or h o w - n o t - t o -
do-it) flavor. As Lichtenstein et al. [1977, p. 317] said in a different context: 
"The most striking aspect of [this literature] is its 'dust-bowl empiricism.' 
Psychological theory is largely absent, either as motivation for the research or 
as explanation of the results." Nevertheless, the references contained in the 
appendix may provide clues about successful implementation for practitioners, 
and they may suggest testable hypotheses about implementation for research-
ers. Implementation research based on some theory or model of the implemen-
tation process, or at least on some systematic body of empirical data, could 
have substantial practical benefit. 
Conclusion 
A basic tenet of professional auditing is that independent auditors should 
maintain an attitude of "professional skepticism" about their clients' financial 
statements. Research in audit decision making suggests that some skepticism 
about professional audit judgment might also be appropriate. The reason is not 
because audit judgment is poor, but because a skeptical attitude may lead to 
ways of making it better. Auditing practitioners prize their judgment and tend to 
emphasize its strong points. Auditing researchers explore the limitations of 
judgment and tend to emphasize its weak points. More importantly, both 
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parties recognize that strong and weak points exist, and that it may be possible 
to capitalize on the strengths while compensating for the weaknesses. To the 
extent that this is effected through decision aids, it becomes important to 
validate decision aids and to understand the effects of using them in practice. 
While we believe that the shift from experience-based to research-based 
auditing and the related emphasis on decision aids will continue, it must be 
remembered that the purpose of such aids is to augment rather than replace 
human judgment. Moreover, since many audit decision aids are built upon 
human judgment and require judgmental inputs for their operation, research 
that improves our understanding of auditors' knowledge, expertise, and 
decision making skills will be even more important in the future than it is today. 
At the very least, cost-effective resource allocation will require an understand-
ing of which decisions need aiding and which do not [Ashton et al. 1989]. As 
Fischhoff [1982, p. 444] said in a more general context, "Good practice will 
require better theory about how the mind works. Good theory will require 
better practice, clarifying and grappling with the conditions in which the mind 
actually works." In audit decision making, we believe that both better theory 
and better practice can be achieved by efforts at all points along the research/ 
development continuum and, especially, by sharing the results of those efforts 
among researcher and practitioner members of the auditing community. 
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Appendix 
A sample of "implementation studies" is included in this Appendix. Most of 
these studies involve computer-based information and decision support sys-
tems, or operations research/management science models. Similarities may 
exist between the problems encountered in introducing or implementing 
information systems or management science models and those likely to be 
encountered in implementing audit decision aids. Almost all of the articles listed 
here have an extremely "practical" orientation, focusing on factors claimed to 
affect the successful or unsuccessful introduction of an information system or a 
management science model. The articles describe surveys of developers and 
users of systems or models, as well as personal experiences of the authors 
with successful and unsuccessful implementation efforts. Eighteen articles are 
briefly annotated, and the references for another 26 are provided without 
comment. We regard the annotated articles as potentially more promising for 
auditing practitioners and researchers; the others tend to be less comprehen-
sive or somewhat redundant with those that are annotated. 
1. Adelman [1982]: Presents the author's view that unsuccessful imple-
mentation of decision aids is caused largely by lack of user involvement in the 
development process; offers the argument that user involvement enhances 
understanding of, and commitment to, the aid and enables the aid to be tailored 
to the user's needs. 
2. Elam and Konsynski [1987]: Argues that decision support systems are 
not being used as interactive problem solving vehicles as originally envisioned; 
offers advice on how this situation might be rectified. 
3. Fuerst and Cheney [1982]: Reviews a large amount of research 
literature on the implementation and use of computerized decision support 
systems. Factors found to affect the use of such systems are discussed under 
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three headings: characteristics of the decision maker, characteristics of the 
implementation process, and characteristics of the decision support system. 
4. Ginzberg [1978]: Discusses types of implementation research that have 
been conducted and concludes that the only firmly-established research result 
is the importance of management support and user involvement; offers advice 
about successful implementation, including the importance of recognizing that 
several users may be involved and that they are likely to have different goals 
and expectations about the model or system being implemented. 
5. Ginzberg [1981]: Analyzes the role of users' unrealistic expectations as a 
factor in the failure of management information systems and decision models; 
has some suggestions about bringing expectations in line with the capabilities of 
the system/model, and vice versa. 
6. Green, Newsom and Jones [1977]: The principal findings relate to 
potential barriers to the use of quantitative techniques. While a lack of 
knowledge of such techniques by management is the most important barrier, 
lack of useful training, difficulty of quantifying data, and cost are also important 
barriers. 
7. Gupta [1977]: Offers advice based on the author's personal experience; 
advises not threatening the user's authority, among other things. 
8. Huber [1983]: Reviews research on the relationship between the use of 
decision support systems and the "cognitive styles" of users; concludes that 
cognitive style is not related to the use of decision support systems; suggests, 
among other things, that it is better to train users in the appropriate use of such 
a system than to try to design the system to fit particular cognitive styles. 
9. Ives and Olson [1984]: Reviews research on the effects of user 
involvement in the development of computer-based information systems; 
concludes that because of poor grounding in theory and methodological 
problems, a positive relationship between user involvement and system 
success has not been convincingly demonstrated. 
10. Leonard-Barton and Kraus [1985]: Discusses obstacles that must be 
overcome in the implementation of new technology; suggests strategies for 
successful implementation, with particular attention to the composition of the 
implementation team. 
11. Little [1970]: Provides an excellent discussion, distilled from the 
author's own experience, of why managers often do not use models that have 
been developed for them; also discusses six characteristics that a model should 
possess in order to be useful (and used). Several worthwhile points are made. 
12. McArthur [1980]: Based on personal experience, the author discusses 
three reasons for the gap between development and use of management 
science models: (1) technical elegance vs. "people factors"; (2) reluctance of 
decision makers to admit they sometimes need help with decisions; (3) 
confidentiality of certain types of important decisions. 
13. Mohan and Bean [1979]: Four case studies of implementation efforts 
are described, and several implications for successful implementation are 
derived. These implications fall into three broad categories, with a number of 
useful points made within each: (1) preconditions for successful introduction, 
(2) introductory period requirements, and (3) on-going period requirements. 
14. Robey and Zeller [1978]: Analyzes the successful adoption and use of an 
information system in one department of a company, and the rejection and 
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failure of the same system in a similar department of the same company; makes 
a number of points about the organizational and human factors that were 
important in the success (and in the failure). 
15. Urban [1974]: Based on the research literature and the author's 
experiences with actual companies, an eight-point plan for building useful 
models is presented. Several relevant points are made. 
16. Watson and Marett [1979]: A survey of management scientists, 
disclosing ten major reasons for implementation problems; lack of understand-
ing by users is most important, but other reasons are also discussed. 
17. Wolek [1975]: Views the adoption of models and other quantitative 
technology in terms of the theory of adoption/diffusion of innovations, on which 
there is a substantial literature; a useful perspective on the factors that are 
important in successful adoptions. 
18. Zand and Sorensen [1975]: Applies a general theory of social change, 
proposed in 1947 by psychologist Kurt Lewin, to the problem of implementing 
management science methods/models; oriented toward an "academic" re-
search audience; contains a useful overall perspective on change, as well as 
several specific ideas. 
Other references that may be helpful are Alavi and Henderson [1981], Alter 
[1977], Anderson and Narasimhan [1979], Annino and Russell [1981], Argote 
et al. [1983], Ashton and Ashton [1988], Bell [1985], Cain [1979], Carter 
[1984], Emshoff [1978], Evan and Black [1967], Glen and James [1980], 
Grayson [1973], Hammond [1974], Hayes and Nolan [1974], Lawless [1987], 
Lucas [1981], McInnes and Carleton [1982], Meredith [1981], Richels [1981], 
Schultz and Slevin [1975], Schultz et al. [1987], Sheil [1987], Vazsonyi [1978], 
Wagner [1981], and Zmud [1979]. 
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